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In April 2021, dozens of asylum seekers were moved back
to the Napier Barracks in the UK, after the barracks had
been emptied a month earlier following protests and
media reports on its unsuitable conditions. Migrant sup-
port groups and NGOs denounced the ‘terrible condi-
tions of the substandard accommodation and the effects
it is having on its residents’.1 Asylum seekers organised
many protests against the unliveable conditions and sev-
eral started hunger strikes. In the wake of this mobilisa-
tion, the Independent Inspector of Migration, Border and
Asylum also reported inadequate resources and that the
‘environment at both sites [Penally Camp and Napier Bar-
racks], especially Napier, was impoverished, run-down
and unsuitable for long-term accommodation’.2 Finally,
public outcry after a Covid-19 outbreak at the barracks
led the Home Office to transfer the asylum seekers to
hotels where they were to wait to be transferred to an ac-
commodation centre or a flat, according to the ‘dispersal
policy’ that has been enforced in the UK since 1999. At
about the same time, the UK government introduced
hotel quarantine for travellers crossing borders from a
number of countries deemed a risk for bringing ‘mutant’
Covid-19 variants to the UK. Notably, this continuum of
hybrid forms of confinement has been enforced in the
name of both migrants’ and citizens’ protection.
Anthropologist Didier Fassin has compared the treat-
ment of undocumented asylum seekers and prisoners in
France, observing that the latter received more attention
than the former during the pandemic. While undocu-
mented migrants were forcibly contained and confined,
thus exposing them to the increased risk of Covid-19
infection, the French government simultaneously took
measures to reduce the carceral population.3 Fassin ana-
lyses these contrasting measures as indicative of moral
hierarchies,which place migrants at the bottom of a scale
of humanity, and the resulting politics of indifference
towards migrant lives. Indeed, Covid-19 has made visible
many of the hierarchies of life, while obscuring others.
Yet, Fassin’s distinction between incarcerated and un-
documented populations leaves out the extensive use of
bordering as a technique of governing in the pandemic.
Responses to Covid-19 have been characterised by a con-
finement continuum. The proliferation of languages of
lockdown, quarantine or self-isolation and the numer-
ous measures taken at borders, ‘vaccine nationalism’ or
the geopolitics of travel restrictions illustrate the hetero-
geneous forms of bordering and rebordering enforced by
states to respond to the pandemic.
In this piece we investigate the multiplication of
heterogenous bordering mechanisms during the Covid-
19 pandemic and question the misleading opposition
between freedom of movement and claims for equal ac-
cess to public health that have followed from this. Covid-
19 has not only become coterminous with borders and
bordering, but it has entrenched their acceptability as
techniques of governing. We argue that we need to chal-
lenge bordering mechanisms at large and that collective
struggles for health cannot be divorced from collective
struggles against borders and bordering mechanisms.
The multiplication of borders during Covid-19 has in-
tensified social-economic inequalities and hierarchies
of vulnerability, as migrants’ confinement during the
pandemic highlights. Yet, with the exception of mobil-
isation against migrants’ confinement in barracks, bor-
ders have tended to be seen as primarily a means of pro-
tection against the virus, both in public debate and on
the left. A case in point is the debate within the UK La-
bour Party,where those who endorsed the so-called ‘Zero
Covid strategy’, building on Australia and New Zealand
as examples, advocated for border closures in the name
of citizens’ protection against the virus.4
Covid-19 has triggered a spatial crisis on multiple
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levels: during the lockdown, class, gender and racial in-
equalities intersected and became newly visible in terms
of the space that people could or were forced to live
in. Cramped spaces and spatial deprivation have been
among the main factors which intensified the highly un-
equal impact of the pandemic. As feminist abolition-
ist scholar Ruth Gilmore has stressed, the state’s organ-
ised violence and organised abandonment have become
blatant during the pandemic.5 Yet, together with such
a spatial crisis, we suggest, Covid-19 has also been a
crisis of borders. Indeed, in March 2020, in the space of a
few weeks, states introduced multiple border restrictions
and people’s movements were suddenly distinguished
between ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’.6 In February
2021, the UK strengthened border controls by impos-
ing two mandatory expensive Covid tests to everyone
who enters the country and a hotel quarantine system
for travellers coming from countries on a ‘red list’. At
the same time, a travel ban has been imposed on people
who exit the country ‘without a reasonable excuse’. The
‘reasonable excuses’ to leave the UK include carrying out
‘activities related to buying, selling, letting or renting a
residential property’.7
During the pandemic, borders have not simply mul-
tiplied. Most border restrictions have been conditionally
or de facto unequally enforced. The borders of Covid-19
encapsulate what Balibar has defined as the function
of differentiating individuals.8 By speaking of rebor-
dering the world we do not, then, refer only to the re-
establishment of many restrictions to freedom of move-
ment. We use bordering here to refer to the practices
of constructing, maintaining and reproducing borders
and boundaries.9 In fact, rebordering is not only about
more borders: it also concerns the enactment of class-
based and racialised access to mobility. Even during the
moments of strictest lockdown, mobility has never been
fully stopped; rather, it has been an object of deep asym-
metries and inequalities – in terms of who is allowed
to travel and who can actually do it, due to the costs of
mandatory tests, forced quarantines and diverted routes.
These asymmetries have also concerned those who con-
tinued to be forcibly moved, as deportation flights have
continued throughout Europe.
Visible borders: geopolitical rebordering
Historically, pandemics and epidemics have been mo-
ments of deep economic and geopolitical restructuring.
As Alison Bashford has pointed out, ‘infectious disease
has been central to the political, legal and commercial
history of nationalism, colonialism and international-
ism, as well as to the twentieth century of a newly ima-
gined space called “the world”’.10 In fact, the bordering
mechanisms that infectious diseases have historically
triggered have been not only spatial and physical fronti-
ers, but also racialising boundaries. For instance, during
the yellow fever at the end of the nineteenth century,
immunity in New Orleans functioned as a criterion for
redefining and strengthening modes of exploitation, ex-
clusion and commodification of slaves.11
In fact, as Foucault has retraced, the responses to
diseases reveal specific regimes of power and of power
transformations – leprosy: sovereign power; plague: dis-
ciplinary power; smallpox: biopower and security dis-
positifs.12 The ongoing rebordering of the world should
be situated within this history of contagion, health and
borders and, at the same time, grasped in its specificity.
Yet, Covid-19 is the first pandemic that has triggered a
global lockdown. Fassin has pointed out that the current
health crisis ‘is not unprecedented because of the pan-
demic, but because of the response to the pandemic. We
have had worse pandemics in the past, but we have never
had one for which confinement has been imposed on a
global level’.13
The question of how to respond to the virus has
largely been framed in terms of the binaries of con-
finement/travel, borders/freedom of movement, eco-
nomy/health. Borders become tied to a neoliberal dis-
course of circulation, while the claims of health have
been underpinned by an imaginary of protection, vol-
untary confinement, rights restrictions and emergency
measures. Carlo Caduff asks how such interventions
and lockdowns have become so widespread globally and
argues that ‘[t]he locked-country approach seemed to ob-
viate the necessity of justifying a differentiated strategy
that might have looked unequal and unfair and that
might have intensified social and political conflicts along
multiple internal fractures and fault lines’.14 Caduff’s at-
tempt to formulate a transversal critique has been a rare
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intervention, particularly as many scholars and activists
urged against delaying lockdowns and demanded border
closures in the UK. Much of the discourse on the left was
formulated as demands for more or total restrictions in
the name of protection, a call to render borders imper-
meable (for the virus): the more we close borders and
restrict mobility, the argument goes, the more we regain
control over the global health threat.
Borders can never be made impermeable, however,
and the discourses of stopping movement versus neolib-
eral circulations obscured the intensification and multi-
plication of racialised and class-based bordering. More
recently, scholars have drawn attention to how responses
to Covid-19 ‘have relied heavily on border management
and borders being rapidly reinvigorated as a key strategy
to contain the virus’.15 Borders were not only reactivated
or reinforced at the state borders, but also at a whole
series of levels, from the household to the city and the re-
gion. This happened despite World Health Organisation
advice against travel and trade restrictions. In fact, bor-
ders have never been completely closed in Europe, even
as restrictions on movement have been implemented in
the Schengen area and the UK. Rather, different filtering
mechanisms were brought to bear upon non-EU popula-
tions. In the EU, the initial travel ‘ban’ applied to non-EU
countries and the new category of ‘non-essential’ travel.
The distinction ‘essential’/ ‘non-essential’ differenti-
ated not only social behaviour, but also movement across
borders. As the 2020 harvest season was about to start,
masses of seasonal workers were brought to EU coun-
tries. In April and May 2020, about 40,000 seasonal work-
ers, mainly from Romania, were brought to Germany on
special charter flights. If the category of ‘essential’ has
applied to different forms of work throughout the pan-
demic, this was not the case for intimacy. Family and
personal relations were subjected to border restrictions
and subsequently to different practices of filtering and
increased border surveillance. In the Netherlands, for
instance, long-distance relationships can become exemp-
ted from the travel ban, but only under certain conditions
of intensified policing of intimacy:
You and your partner have been in a relationship for at
least 3 months. Before the entry ban came into force due
to coronavirus, you saw each other within your relation-
ship at least twice in person. For example, during a stay
at a house or a hotel. Or once for a period of at least 4
weeks. You have proof of this, such as airline tickets and
hotel reservations.16
In the third lockdown in the UK, the language of ‘es-
sential travel’ was subtly modified by ‘reasonable excuse’,
so that work and study could be supplemented by ‘prop-
erty viewings’.17 In the Schengen area, property took on
another meaning when restrictions applied in practice
mostly to those travelling by public transport, but not
those driving in private cars.18
Different bordering techniques have governed the
distribution of bodies in time and space during the
pandemic. Spatial separation or segregation, for in-
stance, supplemented delays in visas and asylum applic-
ations alongside the slowing down of movement. The
other boundary that emerges is between ‘governable’ and
‘non-governable’ populations. The governable are those
who embrace hygienic citizenship and sanitary borders,
while those deemed potentially ungovernable need to
be trained into hygienic conduct and responsibility to
others or forcibly compelled into the practice of hygiene.
As Bashford remarked about the governing of tubercu-
losis, ‘new powers were created for the regulation of those
persistently represented as “dangerous” and ungovern-
able’.19 These lines that separated the governable from
the ungovernable are drawn through ‘the complicated
play of race, space and power’.20 The making of non-
governable populations during the pandemic should be
considered in conjunction with a politics of letting some
populations die, as was the case with various vaccine
campaigns – for instance, Israel not supplying vaccines
to Palestinians.
The pandemic reframed questions of rights and
struggles as questions of ungovernability. Those deemed
incapable of self-governing became the target of milit-
arised measures, as in the case of the Roma in Romania,
Hungary, Italy or Slovakia. Lockdowns of Roma com-
munities were often enforced by police violence and mil-
itarised presence. As the European Roma Rights Centre
notes, ‘Restrictions on freedom of movement made it
impossible for Roma who are day labourers or depend-
ent on the casual economy to travel to earn money’.21
Internal frontiers became the new cordons sanitaires of
Covid-19, while anti-Roma racism justified violence in
these internal borderzones as limited to the ungovern-
able, the disorderly and the disruptive.22 In Italy, evic-
tions from Roma camps continued throughout the pan-
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demic.23 As Caduff noted, the generalised lockdown ap-
peared to avoid the problem of internal fractures and
boundaries by presenting the image of an undifferen-
tiated mass – or that of equal citizens able to govern
the limits of their freedom. Yet, the lockdown was an
archipelago of carcerality, which multiplied borderzones
along both internal and external frontiers and fragmen-
ted the territorial unity of the nation state through the
proliferation of local ‘red zones’. The pandemic was made
governable through visible technologies of bordering and
rebordering.
The ‘ungovernability of migration’ took centre stage
during the global lockdown. In Europe, in April 2020,
Italy and Malta closed their ports to migrants’ disembark-
ation by declaring them to be ‘unsafe harbours’ in Covid
times. For the first time, two European states closed their
borders to people seeking asylum by arguing that, due to
the rate of Covid infections, they were not safe territories
for migrants. Even on the mainland, tactics of migration
containment have been rife. Hybrid sites of confinement
and detention have been used for isolating migrants in
the name of their own protection, as well as the protec-
tion of citizens. In Greece, asylum seekers have been sub-
jected to protracted forced lockdowns in refugee camps
and in hotspots, while migrants who landed in Italy or
who were already on the territory and who tested positive
have been transferred back to the sea, on board so-called
‘quarantine ships’.24 The quarantine ships do not just
isolate migrants – both those who reach Italian shores
and even those who are already on the territory. They
become sites of filtering and deportation.25 In Northern
Italy, buses have been used for isolating migrants. In
fact, throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, humanitarian
and security logics have been inflected by the logic of
‘confine to protect’.26
However, Covid-19 did not stop, nor did it substan-
tially decelerate, migrants’ movements. Even if in 2020
there had been an overall decline in migrants’ arrivals
across the Mediterranean Sea, if we look at statistics in
detail, we observe a shift in migrants’ routes rather than
a sharp drop. Arrivals from the so-called central Mediter-
ranean route (from Libya to Italy) have largely intensified,
while those from the so-called Eastern Mediterranean
route (via Turkey) have decreased.27 But the substan-
tial drop in arrivals from Turkey was mainly caused by
political tensions between Greece and Turkey, and the
Greek government’s policy of border closure along the
Northern land frontier. The key point is that the pan-
demic has impacted significantly on migrants’ access to
international protection, due to the multiple restrictions,
obstacles and temporary suspensions in accessing the
asylum procedure. In fact, asylum applications in Europe
were down about 31% in 2020, compared to 2019.
In the UK, deportations continued throughout the
pandemic, even as the number of people being deported
was inevitably smaller. For instance, while there were
hardly any deportations to Afghanistan in 2020, there
were hundreds of deportations to Albania in each quarter
of 2020. Deportations also continued outside Europe, for
instance, to Brazil. Most deportations were to France,
under the Dublin Regulations, which were due to end in
the UK on 31 December 2021. According to the Dublin
Regulations, asylum seekers need to apply for asylum
in the first safe country they reach.28 The UK updated
its inadmissibility criteria for asylum claims under the
Dublin Regulations and recently extended the criteria to
include any country that the government deems to be a
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‘safe third country’ for an asylum seeker. Other countries
such as France and Italy had recourse to earlier bilateral
agreements to justify pushbacks at their borders. In its
overview of 2020 activities, the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) reported that it lent its
support towards deportations so that ‘Member States
returned over 12 000 non-EU nationals with the support
of the Agency, only 24% fewer than in 2019’.29
Covid-19 did not stop movement at large or make
borders impermeable: rather, it intensified and multi-
plied the obstructions that some people face in accessing
rights, protection and mobility.
Invisible heterogenous borders
The borders that have been enforced and multiplied dur-
ing Covid-19 are not only geopolitical borders. One of the
distinctive features of Covid-19 has been the heterogen-
eity of bordering mechanisms that have proliferated at
different scales and across multiple sites: urban borders,
social boundaries, regional and zonal borders, and hy-
gienic borders. Such heterogeneity of bordering techno-
logies sheds light onto the uneven spatial management
of the pandemic. For instance, while in some countries –
such as Italy – the lockdown has been implemented on
a regional or even urban scale, in other countries it has
been enforced in a more homogenous way. Overall, apart
from country-by-country specificities, the pandemic has
fragmented the space of the nation state, multiplying
borders and bordering mechanisms within and across
cities and regions.
Urban borders. The space of the city has been cris-
scrossed by invisible racialised and class-based boundar-
ies. Indeed, the lockdown measures and the injunction
to ‘stay at home’ have strengthened deep social and eco-
nomic inequalities in the urban context. In London, the
rate of infection peaked in the ‘Covid triangle’30 formed
by the councils of Barking and Dagenham, Barking and
Newham, where a high number of the population are ‘es-
sential workers’ and, therefore, cannot work from home.
The forced hyper-exposure to the virus and the cramped
living conditions contributed to rendering that area a
Covid hub. In many cities across Europe class-based
boundaries have multiplied as a result of housing condi-
tions, and unequal access to ‘smart work’.
Regional/zonal borders. In April 2021, the Italian gov-
ernment announced a plan to gradually re-open the coun-
try after the lockdown and to loosen mobility restrictions.
As part of the plan, the government will introduce a spe-
cial pass to allow (some) people to move across regions.
In fact, to date the mobility across the country is sub-
jected to multiple restrictions that differ from region
to region, according to a three-colour emergency sys-
tem (yellow, orange and red). Such a regional-based
Covid management was introduced last year to differ-
entiate restrictions on the basis of infection rate and
places available in hospitals. In the space of a few weeks,
regional and local borders have fragmented and inter-
rupted people’s mobility – even if never fully stopping
it.
Hygienic borders. During his New Year’s message, last
year Boris Johnson argued that ‘for the first time, politi-
cians taught citizens how and how often they should
wash their hands’. Overall, the pandemic has enhanced
another shift: bordering mechanisms and modes of gov-
erning have been structured around a hygienic-sanitary
rationale.31 That is, many border enforcement measures
and restrictions to freedom of movement have been en-
acted and justified on the basis of hygienic reasons. In
fact, public health claims have been conflated with and
superseded by hygienic-sanitary norms which consist in
a series of gestures: wash your hands, wear masks, main-
tain ‘social’ distance from each other. As Robert Castel
highlighted in his genealogy of the hygienic-sanitary
rationale, the latter had been mobilised to legitimise
the introduction of ‘social medicine’,32 meaning by that
medicine whose main purpose was to control ‘the health
and the bodies of the needy classes, to make them more
fit for labour and less dangerous to the wealthy classes’.33
Hygienic-sanitary borders are nowadays accepted in the
name of the fight against a ‘global health threat’. In
fact, it could be argued that hygienic borders consist in
the disciplining and enjoining of certain gestures that
people are expected to repeat during the day. By hygienic-
sanitary borders we refer to bordering mechanisms which
introduce or multiply exclusionary processes grounded
on hygienic rules that individuals are expected to follow.
Indeed, hygienic borders are enforced on an individual
basis – since everyone is expected to act responsibly –
and, at once, they influence and alter social relation-
ships. That is, hygienic borders often also become bor-
ders among individuals insofar as, first, they essentially
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consist in keeping a distance between individuals and,
second, because they generate asymmetries when some
do comply with them and others do not.
Social bordering: the simultaneity of mobility restric-
tions, hygienic borders and unequal urban boundaries
has multiplied mechanisms of social bordering, strength-
ening some already in place and also enacting some along
new lines. In some contexts the restrictions on sociality
and movement imposed by state authorities have been
internalised by citizens to the point that their compli-
ance has been guaranteed by the widespread practices of
peer-to-peer surveillance. By peer-to-peer surveillance
we refer to the daily practices of control and monitoring
exercised by citizens over other citizens. The ‘active en-
gagement of individuals in their own surveillance’ has
been key to the acceptability of borders and control.34 For
instance, during the first lockdown in Italy, people have
been reported to the police or filmed by their neighbours
while they were infringing the Covid-19 restrictions by
walking in the street ‘for no essential reason’. Peer-to-
peer surveillance has progressively consolidated into a
social bordering practice.
A common denominator of these heterogeneous bor-
ders and bordering mechanisms is that they have been
enacted and justified in the name of the ‘common good’;
that is, in the name of the common fight against a global
health threat. Yet we would question the widespread ac-
ceptance of these multiple rebordering processes and the
binary opposition between rights to mobility, on the one
side, and struggles for common good, on the other. To
put it in Foucault’s terms, upon which conditions has this
configuration of power turned out to be acceptable?35
Moreover, how can we disrupt such widespread accept-
ability of bordering technologies? Caduff highlights how
difficult, or even impossible, critique has become in coun-
tries like Brazil, the UK or the US, where such critical
diagnosis is seen ‘as playing into the hands of Trump,
Johnson, and Bolsonaro, political figures who seem un-
concerned with public health and staggering inequalities
that afflict our world’.36
This is partly due to how freedoms and struggles
have been isolated, and how the loss of rights has been
rendered as temporary and limited to a present to be
superseded by an imaginary future of health and rights.
The separation between a present of lack of rights and
a future of regained freedoms has also been reiterated
geopolitically. A prominent voice in the Covid-19 de-
bates in the UK stated that ‘Once richer countries such as
the UK have handled and controlled their domestic prob-
lem, they must support less well-off countries in their
efforts to vaccinate their populations’.37 The relegation
to the future – rather than past – of the majority of world
populations obscures their exclusions from the common
struggles over the present.
Holding together in the present: health
and border struggles
The mobilisations of the global feminist movement Ni
Una Menos have been characterised by a focus on the
connections between different forms of violence: gender
violence, border violence and state violence. During the
first lockdown in 2020, Ni Una Menos Italy (Non una di
Meno) insisted on the mutual connections between so-
cial reproduction, unequal access to health and border
violence. Freedom of movement, they contended, should
be at the core of any discussion about social reproduc-
tion, and Covid-19 has exposed the extent to which ‘food
distribution is dependent on migrant workers’. They ar-
gue that ‘the same border regime which kills women and
men confronts us with the constitutive nexus between
freedom of movement and conditions of social repro-
duction’. The pandemic makes clear that ‘freedom of
movement should be at the centre of our struggles for an
equal access to welfare, rights and income’.38
A year later, during the global feminist strike on 8
March 2021, the connections between struggles for the
right to healthcare and struggles against borders have
been reiterated further by Non Una di Meno as key claims
in Covid times. In so doing, Non Una di Meno draws atten-
tion to the multiple bordering mechanisms which have
been strengthened during the pandemic, while positing
claims for freedom of movement and for equal access to
health as struggles to be carried out jointly. Importantly,
Non Una di Meno has foregrounded how racialised border
restrictions regulate the conditions for social reproduc-
tion and, at the same time, make (some) people die, for
instance by forcing migrants to travel along unsafe routes
and by exposing some to unsafe environments during
the pandemic.
As we have shown, the binary opposition between
freedom of movement and health has underpinned the
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debate about border restrictions and has been one of the
reasons for the absence of critique directed towards the
rebordering of the world. Such an ethical and political
impasse has, however, been unsettled by the abolitionist
movement which makes claims for freedom of movement
as a part of struggles for racial justice and against mass in-
carceration.39 Feminist abolitionist scholars have drawn
attention to the unequal and racialised access to health
systems and, at the same time, have highlighted the mul-
tiplication of confinement and detention practices, of-
ten justified in the name of protection. As Angela Davis
has notably stressed, an abolitionist perspective frames
struggles for freedom as the overarching umbrella for
different kinds of struggles – including gender struggles,
anti-detention struggles and antiracist mobilisations.40
Mobilising abolitionism as a method enables, we con-
tend, elaborating struggles for freedom of movement
outside of a liberal framework. This latter ultimately rep-
licates individualist claims–‘I want back my unrestricted
freedom of movement’ – and does not question either
the global inequalities in the right to mobility nor the
links between ‘the mobility of capital and the mobility
of labour’.41
The current geopolitical struggle over vaccines and
the rise of ‘vaccine nationalisms’ further complicate the
discussion over freedom of movement in pandemic times.
Indeed, the sheer asymmetries in vaccine distribution
which happen in conjunction with the multiplication
of borders foreground the importance of not disjoining
struggles for freedom of movement and claims for an
equal access to public health. In fact, the pandemic
should be seized as an opportunity for radically rethink-
ing health, care and the public health system, as well
as patents and intellectual property which have become
key to the vaccine’s unequal borders. Mobility restric-
tions and bordering mechanisms have been justified on
the basis of a blackmailing principle that posits mobility
and health as in opposition to each other: if people do
move, the argument goes, and in particular if they move
for ‘non-essential reasons’, this would be detrimental to
public health. Hence, a critique of Covid-19’s borders, we
suggest, could take as a starting point the need to hold
together struggles for freedom of movement and social
justice claims.
If Covid-19 has been a moment of rebordering of
the world and in which racial and class inequalities
have blatantly emerged or re-appeared through spatial
deprivation, the possibility for critique in Covid-19 times
is connected with the undoing of racialised bordering
technologies. The struggle over the borders of Covid-19
is not only a spatial one. In fact, the tacit acceptance
of bordering mechanisms is reinforced by the argument
that giving up on freedom of movement might be neces-
sary to ensure citizens’ safety in the pandemic. Following
that argument, restrictions to mobility should come first,
as anytime in the future could be too late for fighting the
pandemic. Against this logic, struggles against spatial
confinement need to be intertwined with a radical ques-
tioning of the temporality of ‘incompatible priorities’
between freedom of movement and health. Freedoms
relegated to an indefinite future only reinforce a present
of inequality and injustice.
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